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Governance and Funding Reform in the European Higher 
Education Area 
National system analysis: Hungary1 
1 Introduction 
Hungary has a highly institutional diversified higher education system. There are 
eighteen state universities, seven non-state universities, 12 state colleges and thirty-
four non-state colleges. In this report we deal with the state universities. 
This report on Hungarian higher education is based on existing literature on 
Hungarian higher education as well as on a set of about fourteen face-to-face 
interviews with decision-makers in Hungarian higher education (names of the 
interviewed people can be found at the end of this document). The respondents were 
asked to provide their view on the impact of the reforms on system performance. 
The report is divided into four main sections. Section 2 presents a summary overview 
of reforms in Flemish higher education governance and funding. Section 3 analyses 
the available indicators on system performance and qualifies them based on in-depth 
knowledge of the system. Section 4 examines the main impacts of the reforms and 
the extent to which these have contributed to changes in performance and section 5 
draws a final assessment by the authors themselves. 
2 Reforms in governance and funding over the last ten years 
Hungary’s higher education system comprises 71 institutions: 31 state-financed  
universities and colleges (86% of the students), 26 religious educational institutions 
(6%) and 14 colleges operated by foundations (8%). The total number of students in 
the higher education was about 400 000 in 2007/08 (the participation rate was close 
to 40%), compared to 100 000 in 1990/91. There are 16 state financed institutions 
with more than 10 thousand students, the other end is 31 small institutions with less 
than 1000 students. The so-called integration process in 2000 (mergers of 
institutions) decreased the number of state-owned institutions significantly. Most 
colleges and universities are located in Budapest, but high quality higher education 
is provided in other major towns (Szeged, Pécs, Debrecen, etc) as well. 
Hungarian higher education has been working towards becoming part of the 
European Area of Higher Education for more than ten years. From the academic year 
2005/06, all students entering higher education in Hungary have been studying in a 
2-cycle system that consists of courses leading to a Bachelor (mainly 3 years) and 
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later on to a Master’s degree (2 years). Universities have the right to operate doctoral 
schools and to award doctoral degrees. 
The establishment and operation of higher education institutions are regulated by 
the 2005 Higher Education Act. A higher education institution may launch Bachelor 
and Master courses after having obtained the consent of the Hungarian Accreditation 
Committee, and following the central registration of the given course. Applicants' 
ranking in the first cycle is based on their secondary school grades and their 
secondary school leaving examination results. Only applicants with Master degree 
may be admitted to Doctorate courses. 
The number of students admitted to higher education is limited. The Ministry of 
Education announces the number of state-financed places in each study field every 
year (all together it is about 60 000). Institutions can open further places according to 
their accredited capacity where the students pay the cost of the education. 53% of the 
students were state-financed in 2007/08, the number of state-financed full-time 
students was 76%.  
Reforms in higher education governance 
This section describes the main changes and policy initiatives in governance in the 
period 1995-2008. 
Integration of HEIs in 2000 
The structure of the public Hungarian higher education sector before the year 2000 
was fragmented. There were many highly specialized institutions (i.e. most 
universities and colleges had only one discipline). The integration process was mainly 
legally imposed in a top-down way, applying administrative and bureaucratic tools. 
The aim of the integration process – based on the three principles of location, profile 
and size – was to achieve higher efficiency by merging institutions. Regional 
universities were created as well as some mergers took place in Budapest. As the 
result of this the number of state-owned institutions decreased significantly.  
Increasing institutional freedom in setting their internal governance and 
management structure 
The Higher Education Act 1993 prescribed in detail the internal structure of HEIs, 
including a long list of responsibilities assigned to each governing body. When the 
integration process took place, the internal governance structure of the universities 
was not legally modified: the Senate remains the main decision-making body and the 
powers of the executives – rector, dean – remains as they were before. However, in 
the period 1996–2005 the institutions have been trying to take innovative steps to 
modernize their management structure and interpreted legal regulations in a more 
flexible way (e.g. some institutions introduced directorates with professional staff 
instead of having a system of academics-led committees only). The Higher Education 
Act 2005 made a significant change in declaring that institutions can decide on their 
own governmental structure (within the guidelines of the Act). Some institutions are 
applying the new rules, but in general the old academic and decision-making 
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structures continue to characterize Hungarian higher education institutions. In the 
interviews only a few experts referred to these changes as being important ones in 
the sense that they may have an impact on HEIs’ future. We decided not to further 
analyze its effects in later chapters. A new element in the HE Act 2005 concerns the 
introduction of a new body, the Financial Board (although this body shows resembles 
with the ‘Social Council’). 
Foundation of Financial Boards in 2005. 
The foundation of Financial Boards is obligatory for all state-owned institutions since 
2006. The Financial Board consists of 7 or 9 members that represent different 
stakeholders. Initially the majority of the board members should be nominated by the 
Ministry. However, the institutions successfully disputed this proposal at the 
Constitutional Court, because according to their view it was considered as being in 
conflict with institutional autonomy. In the first proposal the major functions of the 
Board would be to provide strategic guidance and promote institutional economic 
efficiency, i.e. to some extent a decision making role. This concept has been quashed. 
The current Financial Boards do not have a decision-making mandate but an 
advisory one, which is obviously a less powerful position. In most institutions their 
role is rather weak in determining the financial and economic strategy of an 
institution (see also the case studies). 
Reforms in the funding of higher education institutions 
In this section we present the main changes and policy initiatives in fudning in the 
period 1995-2008. 
Introduction of formula funding in 1996.  
Formula funding was introduced into the Hungarian higher education system in 
1993, but it was only in 1996 when it was applied in practice and replaced the 
funding mechanism based on negotiations. The funding formula was based on several 
components and the number of components and funding categories changed 
significantly in about every two years.  
However, it is (and was) mainly input-based and not performance-based (number of 
students, number of qualified teachers, number of PhD-students, resource intensity 
of the programs). In 2005 the system was adjusted to the Bologna-system, taking into 
account the level of the programs as well.  
Tuition fees.  
A long-lasting debate took place on another important feature of funding – full with 
political, ideological arguments. Tuition fees were introduced in 1995 and abolished 
in 1998. Student contributions were introduced in 2006 and abolished in 2008 (with a 
national referendum). Meanwhile the category of the status of “cost-covering” (self-
financed) students appeared: students who were not funded by the state, but 
admitted to the system. They have to cover all the cost of their education. In 2007, 
the number of self-financed students reached 50% of all students studying in 
Hungarian higher education. The number of cost-covering students is limited by the 
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maximum capacity of the institution that is determined in a so-called “capacity 
accreditation” process. These full cost paying students can be found in all levels of 
higher education: from full-time Bachelor studies to MBA programmes. In practice 
however, price setting is taking into consideration a kind of “market value” of the 
programmes and not the real costs.  
Introduction of the student loan system in 2001.  
The number of students who are entitled to get a loan has been steadily increasing 
since the introduction of the loan system in 2001. In the beginning only Hungarian 
students studying in accredited Hungarian institutions were entitled; later 
Hungarian students studying abroad or foreign students studying in Hungary were 
also allowed to get a loan. In terms of access the system is performing remarkably 
well: 84,000 students were in the voluntary student loan system in 2001 (15 billion 
HUF), 250,000 students in 2007 (154 billion HUF). The loan is relatively low in 
comparison with both the international average and the tuition fees and living costs 
in the country. The interest of the loan is close to the market interest rate which 
makes the student loan system self-sustainable from a government perspective.  
Changes in the admission and in the allocation of students among HEIs in 2005.  
Simultaneously with the introduction of the two-cycle educational structure, the 
allocation of state-funded Bachelor students also changed. Instead of using a quota 
system in which the Ministry (influenced by negotiations with the HEIs) determines 
the number of students for each institution and subject area, quotas are set for major 
study fields. Students in study areas (engineering, business, liberal arts, etc) are 
ranked by their results achieved on the final exams in the secondary schools. Those 
who achieve results good enough to be within the quota in the subject area will be 
state-financed and the institutions to which they are admitted will receive the 
funding “attached” to the students. The idea behind the reform is to reduce the role of 
negotiations and to increase competition among institutions.  
For students, the new allocation system seems to be more performance oriented (i.e. 
in the old system, places were allocated among institutions and all institutions got 
state-funded places. Weaker institutions were usually selected by less talented 
students. In the new system students with the best result select first and their 
choices determine the allocation of state-funded places.) 
Increasing the financial autonomy of HEIs in 2005.  
Before 2005 state-owned institutions had to operate as budgetary organizations, that 
is, they were restricted by the Annual Budget Law and the strict rules of public 
financing. The Higher Education Act 2005 did not change the general position of 
institutions (that is, in general they are still regulated by the rules of public 
financing: their autonomy in internal resource allocation increased, but it is far from 
total freedom), but empowered them to take financial decision easier. Nowadays 
institutions are allowed to retain and accumulate residual amounts, to keep their 
own income in a separate account, to pursue business activities without the 
obligation to pay any taxes and duties if certain conditions are met, to sell not state 
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owned properties, to launch limited liability companies, to take long term obligations 
within the PPP programmes, and to subscribe government securities. 
Introduction of three year performance funding contracts in 2006.  
In the contracts the Ministry guarantees an agreed and steady flow of funds for three 
years (the amount of money is agreed upon in negotiations between each institution 
and the Ministry). The HEIs take the responsibility to increase their performance in 
certain fields. Goal achievement and progress is monitored by performance 
indicators. The goals, performance indicators and milestones are selected by the 
HEIs and are approved by the Ministry.  
3 Performance improvements in Hungarian higher education 
The performance of the Hungarian higher education system can be analysed from 
two perspectives: its position compared to the international average and the direction 
of changes in the analysed period.  
The Hungarian higher education system shows significant improvement in two 
performance dimensions: access and capacity to attract funds. Compared to the 
average performance of the sample countries, Hungary has also an above average 
position in these dimensions.  
In other dimensions, however, the Hungarian higher education system has been 
stagnating. These dimensions include mobility (slight below average position), 
research output (with significant lag) and graduation (significant below average 
position). Some remarks can be added to these tendencies, using the components of 
the aggregated indicators. In the research output dimension the number of scientific 
articles showed considerable improvement between 2002 and 2006, but the number 
of patents dropped. As a result the research output stagnated. The below average 
position in graduation is due to the fact that the expansion period of the higher 
education system started later in Hungary than in most western countries. It can 
also be noted that both components for graduation increased between 2002 and 2006, 
but presumably these elements also improved in other countries, so the pace of 
growth does not exceed the growth of the sample average leading to an overall 
stagnation.  
Employability and lifelong learning fluctuated between 1998 and 2006, but with 
different patterns. While employability first grew and then decreased, lifelong 
learning decreased in the first period and then started to grow. Both dimensions are 
in the above average position, but employability is strikingly higher than the 
international average.  
The data for the comparison of the cost effectiveness of Hungarian higher education 
system to the international average is missing. The Hungarian data for the period of 
2002-2006 shows that the expenditure per HE student compared to GDP per capita 
and in euro PPS decreased significantly. This can be explained as an improvement of 
cost effectiveness, but it should be also taken into consideration that the expenditure 
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on higher education also decreased in Hungary during this period (see background 
variables).   
Summary of the tendencies can be seen in the table below: 
     Relative tendency 
     Improving  Fluctuating  Stagnating 
 Below 
average 







compared to the 







 Access (LLL) 
  
 * no data available about cost effectiveness 
 
The overall situation is also influenced by the background indicators: 
· Change in 18 years olds in population: there was a significant decrease of the 
18-year old population in the last ten years, and it is expected that the 
situation will slightly deteriorate further in the future. 
· GCI rank score: in 2001 Hungary was at the back among the countries in the 
survey of the Global Competitiveness Index and degraded its position.  
· GERD as % of GDP: in 2006 R&D expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) was 
only 71% of the international average: Hungary spent relatively less than the 
peer countries. Spending on R&D stagnated in the analysed period (2002-
2006). In the previous period (1998-2002), however, there was a significant 
increase.  
· Public expenditure on HE as % of GDP: Hungary’s expenditure on HE as 
percentage of the GDP was 83% of the international average in 2006, which 
shows that Hungary spends less than most other countries. Moreover, the 
expenditure decreased in the period of 2002-2006. 
· Disciplinary mix: the proportion of science and engineering students 
decreased in the period of 1998-2006. Hungary was constantly below the 
sample average and the gap widened during the analysed period. 
· Unemployment rate: the unemployment rate increased faster, and in 2007 it 




4 Effects of the reforms and other explanations of improved performance 
Integration of HEIs in 2000 
Although the integration took place in the early 2000s, opinions about the process 
and the results differ and give contradictory views. The sensitivity of the topic can be 
illustrated by the fact that there has not been any comprehensive political or 
scientific evaluation about the integration process.  
In the late 1990s mergers of the HE institutions was a widely accepted concept on a 
system level – for instance political parties agreed upon its necessity as the higher 
education system was considered too fragmented. The integration process was based 
on three principles: location, disciplinary profile, size. The integration of institutions 
in large cities in the countryside (such as Debrecen or Szeged), and the integration of 
institutions located in the capital city that have similar disciplinary profiles (such as 
the predecessor institutions of Budapest Polytechnic or Budapest Business School) 
are usually considered as successful integrations (ie. institutions were able to utilize 
synergic effects stemming from the integration, and their economic efficiency 
increased).  
The regional integrations of predecessor institutions located in different cities 
usually are the less successful examples. In these cases the rational of the 
integration (either centralization of financial and academic administration or the 
integration of overlapping educational activities) has not been realized successfully, 
mainly due to the opposition of the parties involved, and due to the weakness of the 
top management of the newly integrated institutions. The disintegration and 
rearrangement of certain new institutions started almost directly after 2000. 
Currently the position of these regionally integrated universities is quite weak, and 
usually they could not fulfill the regional role (attracting more students from the 
region, making regional business collaboration, links to the local governments) they 
are expected, therefore opinions about the success of these integration vary. One of 
the reasons of the failure to integrate these institutions is that the central 
governmental decision makers and the political parties of the local governments 
could not agree upon the selection of the institution that be leading in the 
integration. The interviews usually emphasized the negative consequences of the 
integration process, only few good effects have been mentioned.  
The major problems mentioned are as follows: 
· the integration transformed many previously existing and voluntary 
cooperative relationships into tensions, competition and fights for resources 
because cooperation was imposed; 
· the internal competition for resources stressed the importance of faculties 
(deans), while central management has not been empowered with the 
adequate authorities to deal with this situation: as a result faculties dominate 
institutions, which does not advantage integration; 
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· academic and financial aspects of managing the institution have got mixed 
with each other, leading to confusion, and the academic dominance led to the 
reproduction of ‘soft budget constraints’. 
 
From a managerial point of view it would have been possible to run the institutions 
efficiently with a more centralised distribution of authority (i.e. without structural 
solutions), but it would have required the wisdom and cooperativeness of the staff - 
which was unlikely in the distrustful atmosphere created by the integration process. 
A structural solution to this problem could be to set up the Financial Boards – see 
later. 
The growing importance of faculties fuelled the strive for creating new faculties. This 
has, to some opinions, a negative impact on the financial stability of institutions 
because small faculties can operate less economically. 
One of the major arguments of the government to integrate the institutions was that 
the integration would make the rationalization of institutional operations possible 
(e.g. economies of scale by the reduction of administrative and maintenance costs). In 
practice the debates and fights between the faculties (mostly independent 
institutions formerly) make the exploration and exploitation of organizational slacks 
difficult (e.g. the elimination of parallel activities, setting strategic development 
priorities, etc.). The buildings and other physical resources have not been 
concentrated during the integration and this causes operational waste. As a result of 
these problems (and other, here not mentioned) the integration mostly remains 
formal and the efficiency gains of the process has been questioned.  
On the other hand the growing size and the multi-campus operation of the existing 
integrated institutions require the development of systemic solutions even in those 
cases where the integration is seen as “unsuccessful”. Working in a large-scale 
institution creates managers who in addition to their main academic interests, can 
represent the aspects of economic sustainability, which can be an important element 
in the development of institutional governance in the future. 
An important lesson from the integration process is that a legally imposed and quick 
integration has a lot of drawbacks. Motivation and governmental initiatives are 
needed to ensure results of a slower, more evolutionary process. If the parties 
involved are able to trust each other, to make long-term compromises, and to find 
win-win solutions, then the integration could create a development potential to be 
materialized in the growing ability to attract funds and to better pursue their 
interests in negotiations. 
Foundation of Financial Boards in 2005 
The introduction of Financial Boards at the top level of the institution is an attempt 
to introduce board type management into institutional practice. In the original 
concept (early versions of the reform) the owner (the state) would delegate the 
majority of the members and the board would have significant decision-making 
authority in strategic questions, while the rector had the full responsibility for 
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realizing the strategy approved (and modified) by the Financial Board. The Senate 
consisting of the representatives of students and professors would be responsible only 
for academic affairs (i.e. curriculum). In the final text of the HE Act 2005, however, a 
less powerful Financial Board came into existence in which the representatives of the 
state are in a minority position and the Senate retained much of its original role and 
power.  
As the interviews show, in its present from the Financial Board can be considered as 
the restoration of the ‘Social Council’ whose function was to provide guidance, raise 
new ideas and to voice opinions of academic and non-academic parties who are 
frequently underrepresented in academic decision making processes.  
It is not just the lack of sufficient authorities that makes Financial Boards 
unsuitable to fulfill a controlling role in the institutions. Persons delegated by the 
Ministry are often not suitable, not responsible enough. Currently there are only a 
few members of the Boards who can convincingly represent a wider stakeholder’s 
view on the strategy of the institutions and on institutional policy issues. Another 
problem that the Boards are facing is the lack of their own separate staff who can 
provide the Financial Board with management reports and information. Thus, 
externally delegated members remain outsiders without a realistic view about the 
institution. As problems are framed and decisions are prepared by the rector’s staff, 
the academic management (rector, vice-rectors, i.e. all those leaders who represent 
academic staff rather than support and services) can make the Financial Board to 
declare (and therefore legitimate) their concepts and decisions. In addition, sharing 
information with the members of the Financial Board sometimes is in sharp contrast 
with the interests of the institution. In some cases the academic manager of an 
institution was delegated to the Financial Board of a competing institution.  
The legislator does not provide strong powers to the Board, so its role and powers in 
practice depend on the institution itself. The impact of the Financial Board can be 
significant in those institutions where financial and strategic controlling units are 
missing. An effective role of the Board can be observed if the members of the Board 
have a (business) relationship with the institution before their appointment. In these 
cases the success of the institution is their interest, and they have the necessary local 
knowledge, too. 
There are examples where the relationship between the Board and the institution is 
definitely conflicting. In these cases the Financial Board usually overestimates its 
own role and its members have no realistic knowledge about the peculiarity of higher 
education or the characteristics of its financial operation. The general pattern is, 
however, that there is a peaceful coexistence of the Financial Board and institutional 
management (rector and the administration). 
In the opinion of the interviewees the appearance of the Financial Board has no real 
impact on the improving performance dimensions of the Hungarian higher education 
(i.e. no impact on improved access improved third party funding and improved 
research output in terms of articles produced). 
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Effects of funding reforms 
Introduction of formula funding in 1996 
Formula funding was introduced in 1996. Since then funding formula changed 
almost every two years and the result was an unpredictable funding context. The 
reason for the constant change was that the formula was not used (consciously) to 
influence admission policy, but only to redistribute funding. However, because the 
process contained negotiation elements and the determination of the parameters was 
not transparent, the formula funding just disguised the way how in fact the resources 
have been allocated.  
Frequent changes in the formula and the low level of transparency led to a situation 
where negotiations between institutions and the Ministry continued to play an 
important role, and the financial position of institutions remained hardly predictable. 
Several experts argued in the interviews that in the Hungarian higher education a 
negotiated institutional funding system is effective in reality, but it is carried out by 
“formula funding”, sustaining the image of an objective and predictable funding 
system. 
It should be noted that it is not just the lack of a consistent and credible educational 
policy which makes the formula funding system working improperly. The proportion 
of the labour cost in an institutional budget is about 70-80% of the state funding. The 
staff of the institutions has a public servant status; therefore the funding amount 
cannot be decreased below that level. It has been argued that a fully functioning 
formula funding system would require the elimination of the public servant status in 
higher education. (As public servants, staff enjoy heavy protection, so institutions 
must have a very-very good reason to dismiss them. If the state would not provide 
enough money through the formula funding system, institutions could not pay the 
wages, but they could not dismiss the staff either which is a contradiction. If the 
state would provide money for wages in other channels, it would not be a fully 
functioning formula funding system.) 
Nevertheless, the formula funding system of the 1990s and of the beginning of the 
21st century have had a major impact on access to higher education and the 
expansion of the educational system in Hungary, because most institutional leaders 
assumed that funding is dependent on the number of students. Strategic decisions 
have been based on this assumption. Others were aware that institutional funding 
could not be increased by simply increasing the number of students, but they were 
convinced that stagnating or decreasing student numbers would have harmed their 
negotiation powers. Their negotiation position becomes weaker compared to those 
institutions (or faculties) where student numbers do increase. Increasing student 
numbers have not resulted in the direct increase of state funding. However, it proved 
to be an important argument in negotiations and an important means to maintain 




Apart from the state-funded study places, institutions can enroll students that pay 
full cost for their education. The number of these students paying fees grew steadily 
between 1996 and 2005. Their proportion is the highest among part-time, distance 
learners and postgraduate students. The paid “cost-covering” fees are practically 
functioning as a regular tuition fee (representing the political hypocracy: all the 
Hungarian political parties declare that they are against of the introduction of 
“tuition fee”, and in Hungary there is no tuition fee in the higher education officially). 
The proportion of cost covering students in 2005 was about half of all students. This 
indicates that many students are willing to pay to gain social mobility. That 
underlines OECD calculations that show that the private rate of return of higher 
education is one of the highest in Hungary. This fact also questions arguments 
against a general introduction of tuition fees.  
The status of a student (self-financed or state-supported) is determined in the 
enrolment procedure. Some research shows that social differences (e.g. a higher 
proportion of low-income families in the self-financed category) make the system 
unjust. The Higher Education Law 2005 gives (limited) possibility to transfer 
students from one category to the other, but the concept has controversial elements, 
and the algorithm has unclear factors: the impact of the new regulation is not clear. 
It is surprising, however, that cost-covering students do not (or cannot) enforce 
higher quality in education, and what is more, cost-covering students (e.g. in 
Bachelor programmes) are usually treated as less-qualified students compared to 
full-time students.  
The appearance of cost-covering students has two major effects on HEIs. On the one 
hand, it increases the flexibility of HEIs as the revenues generated from that source 
can be spent (almost) without restrictions. On the other hand, it increases the 
market-sensitivity of institutions: positive or negative impacts can be really seen in 
the nearest future when the number of potential students from the relevant age 
groups is likely to decline.  
Introducing cost-covering funding plays an important role in the expansion of higher 
education. It has not simply created the possibility for students to learn but it also 
encouraged institutions to increase the number of cost-covering students to balance 
their budgets. This process, however, did not go together with the improvement of 
quality. On the contrary, the general opinion is that the average quality of the higher 
education graduates has been decreased as a consequence of the rapid expansion of 
Hungarian higher education. 
Introduction of the student loan system in 2001 
The student loan system supports students to cover living costs rather than the 
tuition fees, because the maximum loan is relatively low. Therefore, the existence of 
loan system does not explain the rapidly increased access to higher education. 
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The student loan system has two indirect effects. First, the loan is attached to the 
student, which raises the sense of responsibility and the general level of financial-
economical culture. Students learn how to manage debts and risks. Another impact of 
the existence of the student loan system is that it has been used as an important 
argument in the debates about the general introduction of tuition fees (which was 
unsuccessful as we described in the introductory chapter). 
Changes in the admission and in the allocation of students among HEIs in 2005 
As we described in the first chapter, the aim of the reform in this area was to make 
the allocation of state-funded students more competitive by setting quotas for major 
study fields instead of negotiating with the institutions and with the representatives 
of the given areas. Institutions located (or having affiliations) in Budapest were the 
main beneficiaries of the new system. The position of the small countryside 
institutions worsened significantly with the decrease of state-funded students, and 
the decline could not be balanced by recruiting more cost-covering students. The 
strength of the institutional protests proved that the reform had a real impact, not 
just on the allocation of students but on the allocation of state funds as well. 
There are some unintended consequences of the “competitive” system. Formula 
funding mainly based on the number of students and the reform in admission 
together made former colleges interested in building capacities on higher levels and 
trying to accredit and offer programmes in master and doctoral level. Another 
consequence is that the declared principles of capacity building in infrastructure are 
in contradiction with the results of the changes in admission:  the EU resources are 
primarily available for the countryside institutions where the number of students is 
decreasing. And finally, as size of the 18-25 age group is declining, there is a 
competition for those students (young or mature) who normally do not think of 
studying in higher education: the reform contributes to the improvement of access 
indicators.  
Increasing the financial autonomy of HEIs in 2005 
Only a few experts mention that this reform element has had significant impact on 
the institutional practices. Those who referred to this reform usually emphasized the 
intended positive effects, that is, the growing institutional freedom in resource 
allocation and growing possibilities to develop real cooperation with business and 
governmental organisations.  
These changes may significantly increase institutional capacities for capital 
attraction. However, for the moment only a few Hungarian institutions have the 
entrepreneurial spirit and managerial expertise to take advantage of the new 
measures. (It is also a question when the results of the changes will be seen in the 
institutional indicators.) 
Introduction of three-year performance based funding contracts in 2006 
Partly based on experiences of similar systems in other countries, three-year 
performance-based contracts were introduced into the Hungarian funding system in 
2006. In exchange for a guaranteed and agreed flow of state funds for three years, 
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institutions took the responsibility to improve their performances. Goals and 
indicators for measurement of progress were selected by the institutions themselves 
from a list set in the amendment of the Law (and accepted by the Ministry). This 
methodology proved to be too permissive: as a result, some of the selected indicators 
will not show real progress in performance, and there are no real challenges for the 
institutional management.  
It is not clear yet how institutions can be sanctioned if they fail to perform as agreed. 
Several institutions have not even presented the obligatory report to the Ministry, or 
if they have done it, the reports were not based on reliable facts. The Ministry also 
lacks the capacity (persons and statistical database) to control the performances of 
the institutions. In addition, rules of public finance do not support long term 
agreements or contracts and this further reduces the credibility of the long term 
contracts. As a result parties (especially HEIs) do not believe in long term solutions 
and the real value of the contract is perceived as low. The institutions optimize their 
short term activities. 
Most interviewees said that the process of the introduction and freezing of the 
“guaranteed” money (as a consequence of the financial crisis) discredited the 
performance contracts. From an institutional perspective performance contracts can 
be considered more as a political declaration than as a legal document with clear 
implications for their functioning. At the moment three-year performance contracts 
do neither contribute to the improvement of the ability to attract capital, nor to the 
access of HE. 
5 Other factors of influence (alternative interpretations for improved system 
performances) 
Improvement in access  
The expansion in the Hungarian higher education between 1995 and 2004 can be 
explained by a few additional factors: (1) the opening up of the higher education 
system, and (2) the increasing number of potential students from the 19-25 year old 
age-group. Both factors strengthened the belief that higher educational qualifications 
are a general expectation in society as a whole, which (3) attracted older age-groups 
without degree to higher education. This resulted in a further increase on the 
demand side. Higher education institutions have built their capacities according to 
an “ever-increasing” demand. However, from 2005, as a consequence of a declining 
demographic trend higher education capacity is higher than necessary, especially in 
the fields of teacher training, arts, law and economics/business. 
Improvement in the capacity to attract funds 
In spite of the increase of cost-covering students and the increase in the financial 
freedom of institutions, several experts find it hard to believe that institutional 
capacity to attract funds improved significantly. Many alternative explanations were 
provided during the interviews: 
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· Problems in calculation: while business and external sources remains stable 
during the analysed period, state funds decreased; this leads to improved 
values of the indicators. 
· Lack of contextual knowledge: indicators in the analysis covered not just 
higher education institutions, but the research institution of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences as well. The contribution of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences and higher education institutions cannot be separated. It is assumed 
that higher education institutions perform worse. 
· Abundance of resources: the dimension of “capacity to attract funds” has the 
implicit assumption that institutions play an active role in the process. It is 
also possible, however, that their abilities and sensitivity have not improved. 
Instead, it is the abundance of resources that is reflected in the improving 
indicators.  For example, there are many tenders where the participation of a 
higher education institution in the consortia is compulsory or greatly improve 
the chances for success. Other examples are the funds generated from the 
companies’ balance sheets (before tax) to contribute to the development of 
higher education for certain purposes (e.g. innovative research, programmes 
for vocational studies) by the force of the law.  
· A reason for the abundance of resources could be that the business sector 
recognized that investing into higher education is profitable. That might be 
the case for both small-scale (e.g. student services) and for large-scale 
business investments (e.g. PPPs). 
· Low basis: the change in the capacity to attract capital seems significant 
because currently much potential is un(der)explored; therefore even small 
changes can lead to considerable increase. 
· Other factors: there are corporate R&D activities deployed at universities 
(such as the Siemens and Bosch Departments at the Technical University of 
Budapest and the University of Miskolc), but it is the tradition of the 
institution, the social capital of some persons or the location of the university 
(and not necessarily its good services) that make the institution attractive.  
 
The increase of the number of publications 
One of the indicators of research output is the number of scientific publications. The 
increase can be explained as the indirect result of policy making. The restoration of 
PhD training at universities in 1993 and the continually growing expectations with 
regards of publication activities are likely to have an impact on the number of 
publications.  
There are other factors and mechanisms which might play role in the improved 
statistics:  
· One assumption is that the rearrangement of disciplines made teaching in 
sciences and technical disciplines undervalued, and the ‘free’ capacities in 
those disciplines are used for research and producing publications.   
· In its tenders the National Office for Research and Technology prefers or 
requires medical and technological scientists to publish their results. 
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· The cooperation between authors leads to increasing number of articles with 
several authors. Joint tenders also strengthen this trend, because 
participants can be co-authors in articles, even if not all of them participated 
directly in the research led to the publication. 
· Publications may increase as a result of the increase of international 
scholarships and exchange programs. 
6 Final discussion and appraisal 
The general outcome of the interviews is that there have been several reforms in 
Hungarian higher education, although most of them are not perceived as being 
‘radical’.  The reforms have brought changes in the areas of governance and funding 
in the last decade. The institutional landscape changed through mergers, even 
though not all of them have been successful. Institutional autonomy has increased 
(more decision making freedom to shape internal governance structure and more 
financial discretion), but not in every respect. A new institutional governing body has 
been introduced – the Financial Board – but its impact on institutional decision 
making remains to be seen and differs from one institution to another. Tuition fees 
came and went. Three-year funding contract between the ministry and the individual 
universities were introduced, but their effectiveness is seriously questioned. 
Hungarian higher education performed rather well in three areas: access, third party 
funding and number of scientific articles published. There are no clear indications – 
according to the respondents – that governance and funding reforms have 
contributed to these three areas. Changes in system performance of Hungarian 
higher education have been the consequence of other factors. 
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List of people interviewed 
   Name  Position  Date of  
the interview 
 1.  András 
DERÉNYI 
 Head of the National Credit Council 
 Member of the National Bologna Committee 
 18 May 
2009 
 2.  György 
FÁBRI 
 Director of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, Communication Department 
 26 May 
2009 
 3.  Attila 
KOTÁN 
 Head of Budget Department, Ministry of 
Justice 
 13 May 
2009 
 4.  István 
Vilmos KOVÁCS 
 Former Deputy Director of Development 
Department, National Development Agency 
 20 May 
2009 
 5.  Zoltán 
LOBODA 
 Head of the Department of European Union 
Relations, Ministry of Education 
 26 May 
2009 
 6.  Norbert 
MISKOLCZI 
 President of the National Association of 
Higher Education Students 
 Member of the National Bologna Committee 
 23 June 
2009 
 7.  Dávid NAGY Member of the executive board, National 
Association of Higher Education Students,  
 Member of the National Bologna Committee 
 28 May 
2009 
 8.  Zoltán 
PEREDY 
 Deputy Head of the Strategy Department, 
National Office for Research and Technology 
 19 May 
2009 
 9.  János 
PAKUCS 
 President of the Hungarian Innovation 
Association 
 03 June 
2009 
 10.  Béla 
PALÁSTI-
KOVÁCS 
 Chair of the Non-university sector, 
Hungarian Rectors’ Conference 
 Dean of the Budapest Engineering School 
 Member of the National Bologna Committee 
 18 May 
2009 
 11.  Bálint 
SZABÓ 
 Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 
 Vocational counsellor 




 12.  Tibor 
SZÁNTÓ 
 Chief-secretary of the Hungarian 
Accreditation Committee 
 18 May 
2009 
 13.  Pál VERES  Senior Advisor of the Department of Higher 
Education, Ministry of Education 
 26 May 
2009 
 14.  József 
VÖRÖS 
 Chair of the Economic Advisory Board of the 
University Sector, Hungarian Rectors’ 
Conference, 
 Ex vice-rector of Pécs University 
 21 May 
2009 
The interviews were conducted by Gergely Kováts 
 
Summary of reform effects (based on the expert interviews) 
 
 Reform  Positive effects / 
Strengths 
 Negative effects / 
Weaknesses 
 Impact on 
performance 
dimensions 
 Integration (2000)  Increased efficiency 
 Skilled academic 
managers 
 Contradictory introduction 




 ? capacity to 
attract funds 
 Financial Board (2005)   Stakeholders 
participation 
 Lack of decision-making 
power 
 No impact 
 Formula funding (since 
1996)  
 Regulated economic 
environment 
 Lack of transparency 
 Lack of stable and 
predictable system 
 ++ access 
 “Cost-covering” fees 
(1996) 
 Sensitivity to the 
market needs 
 Contribution the budget 
 Increased social inequality 
 Principles vs practice 
 ++ capacity to 
attract funds 
 ++ access 
 + cost 
effectiveness  
 Student loan system 
(2001) 
 Strengthened financial 




 + access 
 Increasing financial 
autonomy (2005) 
 Cooperation between 
HEIs and business 
organisations 
 Contradictory legal 
regulation 
 + capacity to 
attract funds 
 Admission and the 
allocation of students 
 Increased competition 
among institutions 
 Strategic development of 
the countryside vs student 
preferences  
 ++ access 
307 
 Reform  Positive effects / 
Strengths 
 Negative effects / 
Weaknesses 





performance based funding 
contracts (2006) 
 Performance indicators 
 Medium term planning 
 Weak legal regulation 
 Changing rules 
 Lack of credibility of 
education policy 
 No impacts 
yet 
  
 + / -         weak positive / negative impact 
 ++ / - -     strong positive / negative impact 
 ?             contradictory impacts 
7 Institutional case studies 
Corvinus University of Budapest 
The university as the result of an integration process 
The Corvinus University of Budapest (CUB) was established in 2003 as the result of 
a long and exceptional integration process that contained both voluntary and forced 
elements.  To understand the current governance structure of the university, it is 
worth to take a closer look at some of the details of the integration process.  
The Budapest University of Economic Sciences (BUES; formerly Karl Marx 
University) has made a long-lasting transition from a social science institution 
representing the mainstream ideology of the ruling Socialist Party to an 
internationally competitive business and management school that has introduced 
standard curricula of the western world between 1986 and 1999. The role models 
were the Wirtschaftsuniversitat Wien and the London Business School as elite 
institutions in the field producing the leaders of their country’s administration and 
foreign relations and having a lot of financial and political autonomy. However, there 
was a pressure on the university management to find partners and to become a 
comprehensive, “real” university. 
That was the background of the proposals of the Senate to merge with the Technical 
University of Budapest (in 1996) and with the Eötvös Loránd University of Liberal 
Arts (1999). The first one was preceded by an alliance among four higher education 
institutions in which participants successfully cooperated to win some infrastructure 
development tenders (World Bank initiative) between 1993 and 1996. However, the 
proposal to intensify the cooperation by integrating member institutions was 
rejected, which resulted in the end of the cooperation and the alliance. The 
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University Council of the Budapest University of Economic Sciences wrecked the 
second attempt as well: votes of the defenders of an independent elite school won 
again. 
An amendment of the Higher Education Act on the integration of the Hungarian 
universities in 2000 created a situation where institutions with programmes in only 
one study area were required to accredit programmes in at least one other study area 
– for BUES the simplest solution was a merge with the College of Public 
Administration. As the result of that the Budapest University of Economic Sciences 
and Public Administration (BUESPA) was established.  
At that time, due to its one-study profile, the University of Horticulture and Food 
Sciences also integrated into a new university, namely the Agricultural University of 
Gödöllő (located in Budapest region) by the Act of 2000. The reason was to create a 
regional university. Conflicts between the members of the constituent institutions 
were so intense, however, that the faculties of the University of Horticulture and 
Food Science started to lobby to stop the integration and they got a government 
permit to be integrated with BUESPA – if they would agree. After long discussions 
the Senate of BUESPA decided that the Horticulture and Food Science faculties 
could join and the new university – as Corvinus University of Budapest – was 
officially formed in the academic year 2003/2004. The seven faculties of the new 
university have teaching and research programmes in the fields of economics, 
business administration, public administration, social sciences, horticulture, food 
sciences and landscape architecture. This combination of disciplines is unique in the 
country.  
The Corvinus University of Budapest has about 17,000 students (2007/08), which 
makes them the seventh largest university in the country (in terms of 2007/08 
student numbers). Student numbers stagnated in the recent years. The boom in 
student numbers happened earlier, in the 1990s. About 46-49% of all students are 
cost covering (i.e. fee-paying) students between 2004 and 2007. The percentage of 
foreign students (excluding trans-border students with Hungarian nationality) 
compared to the number of full-time students fluctuates between 7 and 8 percent 
between 2004 and 2007. 
Number of enrolled students 
 2001/2002* 2002/2003* 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 
Corvinus University 
of Budapest 
15 543 16 212 17243 17 342 17 322 17 879 17708 
Hungarian higher 
education  
313 238 341 187 366 947 378 466 380 632 375 819 359 391 
* CUB did not exist in these academic years. Numbers of students were calculated for 
comparison purposes only, by summing up the students of faculties which currently form CUB. 
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The university has 290 doctoral students on average (1,6% of all students); they 
study in one of the 8 doctoral school of CUB.  
According to the statistics of the Ministry of Education and Culture the yearly 
average of income generated from contractual R&D activities is 307,9 million HUF: 
the fourth largest amount among Hungarian HEIs. The university was especially 
active in contractual R&D activities: in 2005 12% of all contractual revenues of 
Hungarian higher education institutions are generated by CUB. The university also 
established a project-company to act as an intermediary for business 
enterprises/agencies and the institution. The establishment of new spin-off 
companies is planned in the near future (to provide food and horticulture research).   
As can be seen from this short description, Corvinus University of Budapest (and its 
predecessors) performed well in student and capital attraction compared to other 
Hungarian higher education institutions2. 
The structure of the university 
The structure of the organisation and the management changed several times during 
the integration process. During the first years of the integration the then rector 
attempted to create a highly centralised structure in which the central 
administration was run by professional directors. The academic structure was also 
changed by eliminating some departments and merging others. In the second stage of 
the integration, a new rector was elected in 2003. He was committed to 
decentralisation, so he eliminated the directorates and restored the traditional 
governance and decision making structure.  
As a result of that a high degree of faculty autonomy characterizes nowadays the 
decision-making mechanisms of the university. Only decisions primarily concerning 
university policy and financial and operational framework are centralized in an 
integrated university management system.  
Faculties (1) are entitled to define their own organizational structure, internal rules 
and regulations. Therefore academic structures greatly vary across faculties and this 
leads to a lack of transparency. Some faculties have departments, others have 
institutes, and there are faculties having both. Faculties frequently establish centres, 
research centres and project organisations. At one of the faculties that has 81 full-
time employees, there are four institutes, but 38 research centres as well. 
Faculties (2) play an important role in defining the structure of the study 
programmes and in managing research activities. And (3) they are also responsible 
for most of the administration and services in relation to study programmes, and also 
for decision-making regarding especially but not exclusively student affairs. In 
                                                   
2 See indicators in detail in the Hungarian System level report. 
310 
 
addition (4) faculties enjoy a high degree of autonomy concerning their own revenues. 
State funds are also allocated to faculties. Finally (5) in most cases deans rather than 
the rector are dealing with the employer's rights. 
Faculties are governed by a dean and by Faculty Councils. Councils consist of 
representatives of departments and students to provide significant departmental 
influence on faculty issues. 
Another distinctive feature of the university’s governance system is the composition 
of the supreme decision-making body, the Senate. It has 38 voting members: 1/3 of 
them are students who have strong influence on university affairs. The other 
members are delegated by faculties or are ex-officio members. Although the size of 
faculties in term of student and staff numbers or budgets varies significantly (e.g. in 
2007 the largest faculty had eight times more students than the smallest one), 
faculties are represented in the Senate by an equal number of staff members. This 
creates tensions among faculties and encourages the larger faculties to further 
decrease the significance of the central level.  
In addition to the Senate, there are other institutional level bodies. The Rector’s 
Cabinet is an operative body, where the agenda of the Senate is discussed with the 
deans. The Financial Board gives recommendations and voices its opinion on every 
financial issue. It has an indirect influence on university affairs and it can be 
considered mainly as a consultative body, although its consent is required for major 
financial decisions.   
A rather new phenomenon in the development of the university structure is the 
appearance of a middle-management and governing layer between the central and 
faculty level, which is called the campus level. Its role is to coordinate issues 
regarding infrastructure maintenance and development, room allocation and 
timetable planning. It also serves as a place where faculties of the campus can 
harmonize their interests. This development is contradictory, however. Some 
consider it as an obstacle of completing the integration in the future because it re-
creates and re-institutionalizes the three predecessor institutions. Others think that 
the campus level is a good way to increase resource allocation efficiency by some kind 
of centralisation without seriously harming the interests of faculties. 
The central management of the university is led by the rector. The three vice-rectors 
are responsible for (1) educational and research affairs, (2) for international affairs 
and (3) for strategic issues. Vice-rectors supervise the central administrative offices 
(i.e. Central Academic and Information Technology Office, Quality Office, 
International Office, Communication Office, Corporate Partnership’s Coordination) 
and support services (Career Office, Information Technology Service Centre, Central 
Library of the University). Since the integration of 2003 it has been common practice 
that each constituting institution delegates one vice-rector. Financial and 
maintenance affairs are fully centralised into the General Directorate for Finance 
and Technique.  
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Funding and resource allocation 
The university is a state-owned higher education institution, i.e. a central budgetary 
organisation: expenditures of both state funding and own revenues are regulated by a 
special law, which decreases the resource allocation flexibility of the institution even 
though conditions improved as the result of the reforms in 2005. 
In 2008 the income of the university was about 17,000 million forints. The average 
annual income growth rate between 2004 and 2008 was 11,5 per cent (5% in 2004 
prices). On average 53 per cent of the total income came from state funding and the 
remaining 47 per cent was the university’s own revenue (which is similar to the 
national average).  
 Revenues (in million forints) 
   2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
 State 
support 
 6 249,7 
 6 714,2  6 788,3  7 998,8  9 387,1 
 Own 
revenues  5 075,7  5 528,4  5 810,1  7 300,0  8 001,1 
 Total 
revenue  11 325,4 12 242,6 12 598,4 15 298,8  17 388,2 
 
65–70 per cent of the state funding is the training and maintenance grant provided to 
cover the costs for personnel and the maintenance costs of teaching and research 
activities of the university. The rest of state funding is for strictly specified tasks, e.g. 
grants for student bursaries and for special programmes. 
The major sources of the university’s own revenues are fees from training and 
research programmes, tenders and applications, and the utilisation of university 
assets. 2007 and 2008 were outstanding years, as more than one billion forint was 
generated through the utilization of university assets. The vocational training 
contribution3 from companies has been continuously growing as well as the amount 
and the rate of revenue from tenders and innovations. These revenues provide a 
valuable source of investment in educational and information technology.  
Concerning the breakdown of expenditure, wages and social security make up around 
50% of total expenditure.  
                                                   




The internal allocation of resources reflects the decentralised nature of the 
institution. Revenues are transferred to those faculties (and then usually to 
departments) where they were produced. State funds are also allocated to faculties 
by using the formula applied by the government. 
Central organizational units that provide support services (the Central Library and 
the Computer Service Centre) or fulfil administrative and executive roles are budget 
centres who are entitled to manage their finances independently. The budgets of the 
central organizational units are negotiated and agreed upon during budget planning. 
Currently about 80% of revenues are allocated to faculties, while the rest is 
transferred to central executive units, support and maintenance service units.  
Incomes and expenditures are monitored and controlled by a budgetary management 
system. It is worth noting that in the last decade the central academic management 
attempted several times unsuccessfully to introduce a more transparent controlling 
and resource allocation system. 
The effects of the integration on the university 
Teaching  
In the integration process institutions with rather different study fields have been 
merged. Therefore, possibilities for cooperation between these faculties in teaching 
are limited and remained unexploited. What is more, the strengthening of faculty 
autonomy weakened even those relationships which were lively before the 
integration. Some faculties tried to be self-supportive: they try to cover all the 
courses by its own faculty staff even if staff with better qualifications on other 
faculties is available. There are only a few cross-faculty joint educational 
programmes. Paradoxically these tendencies have been escalated by the Bologna 
process. For instance, shorter programmes (three-year BA/BSc and two-year MA/MSc 
programmes instead of five-year programmes) motivated faculties to (continue to) 
teach their own courses.  
Research 
Research has similar symptoms as teaching has. The predecessor institutions of the 
university have always played a decisive role in research (and in curriculum-
development). The advantages of multi-disciplinarity have not really been utilized 
(yet). Although there are some co operations between faculties and research groups, 
which managed to attract considerable external funds, the general pattern is 
different. One of the exceptions is the Regional University Knowledge Centre, which 
intends to enhance the competitiveness of food chain enterprises and was founded by 
the Faculty of Food Science, the Faculty of Horticultural Science and the Faculty of 
Business Administration. 
Research (and counselling) is individualized, especially in social and economic 
sciences where the growing need for consultative services after the 1990s also 
strengthened individualization and the foundation of private companies with 
university employees. Research on these fields does not require significant 
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investments in equipments. Therefore individualization is not limited by 
technological constraints. As a result, research activities are scattered in the 
university (individual and sometimes departmental projects are common), cross-
departmental research projects are fairly rare. As for EU research applications, the 
university itself generally participates as a partner in different consortia (which is 
typical for the country as a whole), and only a limited number of research projects 
has been initiated from university organizational units so far. 
Administration and services 
A unified financing framework has been developed. Financing operations have also 
been standardized. Career services and computer services are centralised and 
information systems (such as student administration and budget control) are unified. 
There are some services which remained decentralised: quality management, 
language education, student administration and libraries are managed on 
campus/faculty level. 
Summary: the impact of funding and governance reforms on the Corvinus University 
of Budapest 
The predecessor institutions of the university differ in size, organizational culture, 
institutional profile and disciplinary environment. Harmonizing interest and 
building trust therefore requires time and integration is possible only gradually. 
That is especially true if we take into consideration all the experiences from in the 
1990s, which made faculties very cautious in negotiations. The frequent ruptures 
(rejected integration requests, failed integration etc.) in the 1990s and the early 
2000s made it virtually impossible to develop a stable vision and to realize a long 
term strategy and organisational development concept for the univeristy. The 
institutions were in the state of constant change.  
After 2003 a decentralized governance structure was adopted that seems to be stable, 
but the price paid is the lack of focus in research and education. The faculties are 
most of time unwilling to cooperate. Therefore, it is still difficult to realize an 
organisational-wide strategy, although reasons are different than they were in the 
previous period. Another consequence of the decentralised structure is that faculties 
can enforce their own interests, which are sometimes in contrast with institutional 
interests. It is an open question whether the introduction of campus-level 
management can improve the situation.  
The formula funding system supports the faculty’s autonomy well, because by using 
the formula the contribution of faculties to total revenues can be easily calculated. It 
is unfortunate that the distribution of costs is not as transparent as that of revenues. 
This is a constant source of tensions.  
In a decentralised organisation, central administration cannot serve as a buffer in 
cases of governmental cutbacks and resource withdrawals, so these must be directly 
distributed among faculties and this leads to further tensions. Theoretically 
decentralisation encourages faculties to increase their revenues and to decrease their 
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costs. Cutbacks and redistribution among faculties (e.g. because of loss-making units) 
usually hit harder well managed faculties and departments, because they have the 
money to cover losses of other units. This has an opposite effect on their motivation.   
The appearance of cost-covering students increased the institutional capacity to 
attract funds, especially in business and public administration, economics and social 
sciences, which became popular study fields in the 1990s. The good institutional 
reputation made student attraction easy. These disciplines attracted many 
international students as well. At the same time, the faculty of Horticulture and the 
Faculty of Food Science were successful in attracting research funds. These faculties 
are more entrepreneurial and try to use the university infrastructure and spin-off 
companies to attract more research funds. Staff in social science disciplines is also 
active in counselling, but this activity is less visible and much harder to channel into 
the university because it is highly individualized and it does not require special 
university equipment. Stronger performance control and more favourable funding 
environment should be created so that researchers in those fields bring their projects 
into the university. 
The increased financial autonomy that was introduced in 2005 also played an 
important role in capital attraction, mainly because it made possible to concentrate 
buildings located in different parts of the city and to develop infrastructure. In 
addition to participate in state-supported PPPs (public-private partnership 
programmes), this is the only available source for infrastructure development. EU 
money is unavailable for institutions in the Budapest-region. 
It is also worth mentioning that although student numbers stagnated in recent 
years, the attractiveness of the university among applicants has not changed much. 
Changes in the admission and in the allocation of students among HEIs in 2005 have 
not influenced significantly the leading position of the university in general (its 
impact on faculties varied, however). 
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University of Debrecen1 
The University of Debrecen as an integrated new university was established in 2000. 
The integration process had evolutionary elements. In 1991, as part of a World Bank 
development programme, the Debrecen Universitas Association was established. Its 
members were the Agricultural University of Debrecen, the Medical University of 
Debrecen, the Debrecen University of Calvinist Theology and the Kossuth Lajos 
University of Arts and Sciences. (Some of them had 600-year traditions). Later, other 
institutions joined the Association: an affiliation of the Ybl Miklós Technical College 
of Budapest, the Kölcsey Ferenc Calvinist College of Teacher Training, Wargha 
István Teachers’ Training College in Hajdúböszörmény, and the Debrecen 
Conservatory of the Liszt Ferenc Music College. In 1996, a cross-institutional body 
was set up to prepare a joint development plan for the future. As part of the 
cooperation, joint educational programmes were launched (e.g. in economics and 
business, in law, in chemistry, and in molecular biology). The cooperation became 
even closer with the foundation of the Federation of Debrecen Universities in 1998, 
which was followed by the full integration in 2000. 
Currently the university has 15 faculties in the areas of medicine, agriculture, arts, 
(natural) sciences, economics, law, informatics, engineering, teachers’ training and 
music.  
In the academic year 2007/2008 the university had 29,000 students, which makes the 
university the fourth largest institution in Hungary. 70% of the students study full-
time and 37% of them are ‘cost-covering’ (i.e. fee paying) students. 5,6% of all 
students are international students. Between 2000 and 2008 the student numbers 
increased by 34% at the University of Debrecen, while on national level the 
expansion was 22%. The difference demonstrates the attractiveness of the university.  
Number of enrolled students 
 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 
University of 
Debrecen 
21 747 23 062 24 723 25 904 27 403 28 366 29 381 29 121 
Hungarian higher 
education  295 040 313238 341187 366 947 378 466 380 632 375 819 359 391 
 
Doctoral education can be followed in 25 doctoral schools. The Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences runs 19 external research groups at the university. Both data reflects the 
research potential of the university. According to the statistics of the Ministry of 
Culture and Education, in the period 2003-2005 the University of Debrecen received 
the second largest amount of funding from international and contractual tenders 
                                                   
1 Written by Gergely Kováts, Institute of Management, Corvinus University of Budapest 
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among the Hungarian higher education institutions. In 2005, the University of 
Debrecen got 35% of all the revenues from international tenders.   
The University of Debrecen is one of the most entrepreneurial universities in the 
country. In 2007, state-owned higher education institutions in Hungary were (joint) 
owners of 68 business ventures: the University of Debrecen participated in 1/3 of 
them. 
Finally, it is worth noting that researchers of University of Debrecen play prominent 
roles in the most influential academic organisations in the country. The Hungarian 
Accreditation Committee (in 2007) and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (in 2008) 
elected its Presidents from the University of Debrecen. 
As can be seen from this short description, University of Debrecen performs 
excellently in the dimensions of access and capital attraction2. 
The structure of the university 
After the integration, the number of faculties increased gradually. 8 new faculties 
have been established since 2000. Currently there are 15 faculties grouped into three 
centres, which have high management and financial autonomy. Two of them, the 
Medical and Health Science Center (MHSC) and the Center of Agricultural Sciences 
and Engineering (CASE) were set up in 2000 (simultaneously with the integration). 
This put the fields of arts and sciences in an asymmetrical position in institutional 
decision making. To counterbalance this situation, a new centre called Center of Arts, 
Humanities and Sciences (CAHS) was founded in 2004.  
The centres do not just coordinate teaching and research activities of their faculties, 
but they pursue activities outside of the traditional higher educational fields. The 
MHSC provides for example health care services, the CASE runs experimental and 
model farms and provides agricultural counselling, and the CAHS runs teachers’ 
training schools. It makes the funding more complex especially in the cases of MHSC 
and CASE, because their special activities are funded from specific (non-academic) 
sources (e.g. health care services provided by MHSC are funded by the National 
Health Insurance Fund Administration). These special activities can be efficiently 
carried out only if all the faculties in a given centre participate. As a consequence, it 
is the centre which is entitled for funding. The complexity in funding and the 
requirement of high level of cooperation within centres explain the high level of 
financing and management autonomy that they enjoy.  
In addition to the centres, the central administration plays an important role in 
institutional decision making. First the central administration provides institutional 
level coordination and administration, i.e. it makes propositions as regards 
university level affairs and manages the negotiations on proposals that come from 
lower levels. Second it also runs central services.  
                                                   
2 See indicators in detail in the Hungarian system level report.  
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The university and its central administration are led by the rector. The president of 
each Centre functions as vice-rector. Teaching, research and strategic matters have 
also their own vice-rectors.  
Since 2004 the central administration has been reorganised: directorates have been 
established and are led by well-prepared and highly educated directors, who can 
assure continuity in task management. Directorates are supervised by the rector or 
one of the vice-rectors. Financial affairs are supervised by the General Directorate of 
Finance, but as a consequence of the decentralised structure, Centres have their own 
directorates (reporting to their Centre and to the General Directorate of Finance) 
that have significant responsibilities and powers.   
Although Centres and Centre presidents working as vice rectors have substantial 
influence on matters of planning and administration, deans representing the 
faculties directly participate in university level decision making through the Dean 
Collegium and the Senate (the main decision making body). The Senate is organised 
on a faculty bases and represents all the interests groups proportionally. In addition 
to these governance bodies, the Rectorial Director Meeting, the Rector’s Council and 
the Financial Board play role in decision making. Most issues are discussed in each 
body; therefore they are scheduled accordingly. 
Of course, the influence of these bodies on final decisions is not equal. The Senate has 
73 voting members, which makes long and profound discussions hardly possible. The 
Financial Board can be considered as a consultative body, even if the opinion 
declared by the Board is usually accepted by other decision making bodies and 
committees.  The major role of the Financial Board is to discuss strategic questions 
and to firmly channel a business approach into the decision making processes.  
 Funding and resource allocation 
The budget of the University of Debrecen was 66,5 billion Forint (ca. 235 million 
Euro) in 2007, which exceeded the budget of the second largest city in the country 
(Debrecen). About one third of the revenues stems from health care services. The 
state support from the Ministry of Culture and Education amounts around one third 
of the total revenues (including students grants which have to be transferred to 
students). The university’s own revenues (tenders, contractual research, etc) are 
around 10 billion Forint. Both the budget and the state support increased by 50% in 
real terms between 2000 and 2007 (this, however, included students’ grants which 
also increased in that period).  
Planning and financing is decentralised and occurs primarily on the Centre-level. 
Budget planning starts with the definition of general allocation principles, after 
which central management and Centres have to agree upon the main budget 
parameters. Centre budgets are redistributed among their faculties and 
departments. In practice the planning procedure is not so sequential: the final budget 
is the result of an iterative process in which all participants try to influence the main 
allocation principles, the amount and the direction of redistribution. It is noteworthy, 
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however, that in contrast to the general practice of Hungarian higher education, 
where budgets are finalised by May of the given year, the University of Debrecen can 
accomplish the process by February. This means that negotiations require much less 
time than in general. The SAP system implemented in 2006 might play an important 
role in that, because it provides current, transparent and unified budget control and 
monitoring.  
Although it is possible for institutions to freely decide on their internal allocation 
mechanisms, this is not taking place at the University of Debrecen. The funding 
system that serves to allocate state funds among institutions is used as an allocation 
tool within the institution as well. 
The budget and public support of Debrecen University in constant and current prices 
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· Source: data in current prices can be found in: Debrecen University Institutional Development Plan, 2008, p. 
14. Data in real terms are the calculation of the author. 
 
The faculties receive 80-85% of their shares, the rest covers the cost of central 
administration and services. Faculties have to cover all their operational 
expenditures, development costs and the expenditures of their centres. Loss-making 
faculties are stabilized by redistribution directed by the Centres and by cross-funding 
from other faculties. Solidarity currently works, but significant resource withdrawal 
can destabilize the balance within the institution.  
 Several factors make planning and resource allocation difficult:  
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· Some important data are only available late in the planning process (e.g. final 
student numbers are available only in October) 
· Revenues can be roughly estimated, e.g. state funding depends on the number 
of enrolled student, but only the number of admitted students is known etc. 
Own revenues (tenders, contracts) can only be estimated.  
· The funding environment is uncertain, exceptional cutbacks or the freezing of 
the savings took place occasionally. 
 
Although the introduction of three-year funding contracts between the ministry and 
the university was perceived as a good initiative, it can only be applied to a small 
portion of the total budget (e.g. see the budget of the Medical Centre). In addition, 
cutbacks because of the crisis discredited the three-year funding contract. 
While revenues can be planned only roughly, high proportion of expenditures is fixed 
(i.e. remuneration and maintenance costs). Development is possible by increasing 
operational efficiency (e.g. outsourcing) or by attracting additional private or public 
sources. The first solution is limited by the fact that the law restricts the resource 
allocation flexibility of institutions (e.g. staff must be employed as public servants). 
The university responds to these limitations explicitly and suggests policy changes in 
its Institutional Development Plan. 
Universities are not allowed to raise credits for development purposes. PPP 
programmes and the establishment of spin-off and project companies (enabled by the 
2005 Higher Education Act) remain as feasible solutions. However, most forms of 
capital attraction require the university to match the funds from its own sources. 
This is obviously very difficult when the university budget is subject to cutbacks. And 
it reduces the strategic room to manoeuvre. 
The effect of the integration on the university 
7.1.1 Teaching 
The integration facilitated close cooperation of disciplines that complement each 
other well. Several faculties are built on the natural sciences. This is a great asset to 
start multidisciplinary programmes, but it also has the danger of redundancy in the 
academic structure and educational programmes. This redundancy cannot be fully 
eliminated because education is carried out in three cities and on several campuses. 
Such elimination is not necessarily desirable because each discipline applies different 
perspectives in teaching. Redundancy therefore is reduced only in courses providing 
general knowledge (basic language and computer skills), bachelor courses and within 
centres/campuses. 
7.1.2 Research  
Successful participation in large-scale, complex research projects is considered as one 
of the main achievements of the integration. These projects simultaneously 
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contribute to the integration of the university, because it requires the involvement of 
different centres/faculties. The largest international project is “Genomnanotech” that 
focuses on research in genomics, nanotechnology and biotechnology. The strength in 
research of the university is also symbolized by the fact that it competes to be the 
location of the European Spallation Source (and the odds look good). 
The integration made the university not just the most comprehensive university in 
the country, but made it also more visible in the international arena. Accumulating 
research experiences in many fields makes the university a resourceful partner in 
university-industry cooperation, because it can successfully approach problems from 
several different perspectives. 
7.1.3  Administration and services 
The integration influenced the administration and services in two ways. First, 
institute level services (library, computer services, language centre, student 
information centre, etc.) were unified. Second, information systems that are required 
for administration and management, have been gradually developed and extended to 
the whole institution. This includes student administration (Neptun system), finance, 
maintenance and management information (SAP), human resource information 
systems and document management systems.  
Summary: the impact of funding and governance reforms on the University of 
Debrecen  
The integration has had a fundamental influence on how the governance and funding 
systems at the University of Debrecen work nowadays. The three centres reflect to 
the three dominant founder institutions (the University of Medicine, the University 
of Agriculture and the Kossuth Lajos University of Arts and Sciences) and managed 
to preserve much of their autonomy. Instead of radically changing the academic 
(micro) structure (e.g. by eliminating or merging faculties or departments), emphasis 
was put on the institutionalization and formal acknowledgement of existing co-
operations that rooted in the 1990s. Co-operation and trust were further enhanced in 
the first four years of the integrated university, when it was a team of 
representatives of the major scientific fields who governed the university. Moreover, 
the rector position was fulfilled in a rotating system, while others in the team stayed 
in charge as vice-rectors (other positions in the organisation were more permanent).  
The integration process was interpreted as finding and grabbing opportunities 
together and developing a viable academic structure in an organic rather than a 
forced way.  There are signs of this path (e.g. doctoral schools are detached from 
faculties and merged into a graduate school which has its own financial and 
administrative responsibilities). 
Co-operation is of course not without tensions, but the atmosphere is constructive 
due to the fact that the integration was not only imposed externally, but it was also 
driven internally. What is more, the governance structure described before was 
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developed against external pressures. Co-operation in the 1990s served as a solid 
foundation for trust, which made a conscious and gradual development of 
management and governance systems possible. The cooperative atmosphere has 
increased the ability of the university to develop attractive and recognized (joint) 
educational programmes, to attract private funds and, in general, to pursue its own 
interests more efficiently.  
In the area of funding state support for the university has been favourably: it 
continuously increased since 2000. The internal funding allocation system used at 
the university copied the national formula, even though the governmental 
distribution system does not calculate per capita normative on cost basis.  
 Fee-paying students play an important role in the financial stability of the 
institution (e.g. 37% of all students were cost-covering student in 2007). The funding 
system clearly orientates faculties to increase student numbers until the limits set in 
the accreditation process and therefore it contributes to the improvement of the 
access indicators. At the same time, actual funding is still irregular (changeable, 
uncertain) and unpredictable and the introduction of three-year contracts has not 
improved this. It has no real effect on how the institution works. 
The Higher Education Act of 2005 increased the financial autonomy of HEIs. The 
University of Debrecen managed to take the advantage of new possibilities by 
founding spin-off and project companies, which play an important role in its capital 
attraction. In general, the full exploitation of the growth potential of the university is 
seen to be prevented by inflexible resource allocation possibilities in employment and 
infrastructure.   
 The introduction of Financial Boards at the top level of the university was meant as 
a significant reform. At the University of Debrecen this Board is functioning as a 
consultative body that assists the decision makers in taking business/financial 
viewpoints into consideration. Therefore the Financial Board indirectly contributes to 
the capital attractiveness (and resource utilization) of the institution.  
The University of Debrecen exemplifies the (near) maximum results within the 
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The homepage of the university (http://www.unideb.hu/portal) 
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